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Many professionals face a conflict between their professional responsibilities to 
protect the interests of their principals or clients and their own self-interests. Auditors 
have a duty to provide an honest, independent opinion on the accuracy of financial 
statements of companies, but they might cater to the demands of their clients and 
accept some misrepresentation, especially if they also have the firm as a consulting 
client and fear that they might lose that business. Doctors that go on study trips paid 
by pharmaceutical companies may prescribe the drugs of those companies more 
frequently. Can a financial intermediary be trusted to give advice that is in the best 
interest of the client, or will he direct the client to that company that gives him the 
highest bonus? In prescribing textbooks for students, do teachers sufficiently take into 
account the cost that they impose on students, or do they just look at how convenient 
the book is for them? In writing a referee report, is an academic more inclined to 
accept the paper if it refers to her own work, since the citations would enhance her 
academic reputation? When an economist serves as an expert witness in an antitrust 
case, it is sufficient and acceptable that he focuses on the client’s position, counting 
on the expert witness of the other side to bring out the counterevidence and on the 
adversarial process producing the truth? 
 
The present book, a collection of papers presented at a conference at Carnegie Mellon 
University, discusses these issues. The editors note that academics have not had much 
influence on debates on these issues, which they trace to the fact that standard 
economic literature is not very useful in this domain. Economists classify the above 
settings as principal agent problems, but the simple version of that theory assumes 
that the agent is motivated exclusively by money. Consequently, that theory does not 
incorporate other regarding behavior and professional norms, which do play a role in 
practice, and it does not allow answering the question why such norms break down in 
certain circumstances. To fill the gap, the conference brought together a 
multidisciplinary audience, including economists, lawyers and psychologists, to 
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  1discuss the prevalence of the problem and possible solutions. Next to an introduction 
by the editors, the collection contains ten papers, each being followed by a chapter 
with commentary. In short, the book addresses the question: what does behavioral 
economics have to say about this issue? 
 
The important message of the book is that the problem may be more serious than 
many observers may believe. First of all, some of the chapters detail the extent to 
which conflicts of interests have corrupted certain professions, such as the accounting 
and medical professions.
2 Secondly, many professionals hold naïve psychological 
theories and believe that they themselves would be sufficiently strong to not be 
influenced and to not deviate from the professional norm. This is similar to most 
people believing that they are better than average car drivers; the truth is different. 
Thirdly, there are no easy solutions to address the problem, and traditional safeguards 
may perform rather poorly, or even backfire. 
 
Existing proposals for solution fall into three categories: substantive regulation, 
aligning incentives and procedural regulation. Structural separation (for example 
prohibiting companies to do both auditing and consulting activities) falls in the first 
category. It is a blunt instrument, not advisable if there are synergies between the 
activities: separating pure academic research from policy research may not be a good 
idea. The incentives of the agent may be aligned more closely with the goals of the 
principal by means of contractual terms and liability arrangements (as, for example, 
proposed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate governance in the US), but the 
literature shows that providing explicit incentives may undermine professional norms. 
Disclosure is a frequently proposed procedural regulation: the professional should 
disclose his interests, so as to allow the audience to discount the advice.
3 The book 
shows that this may be problematic as well since it may lead the advisor to give even 
more biased advice and since the audience typically will not discount it as much as 
should be; as a result disclosure may lead to even worse decisions. 
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  2At the core of the book is the question what motivates people. The book shows that 
the simplistic assumption of materialistic selfishness may not provide an appropriate 
starting point and that norms play a role: people may be motivated to do what they 
“should” do. Yet the book also shows that we should not be too optimistic: if people 
can choose between two situations where in the first the norm “behave fairly” applies 
while in the other it does not, if it serves their self-interest, people may choose to be in 
the second. In choosing between two textbooks, one expensive, but making the 
teaching load light, the other cheap but involving more work for the teacher, the 
teacher might choose not to inquire about the price, so as to avoid the fairness issue. 
 
The book raises issues, cautions against simplistic solutions and shows that behavioral 
economics holds the promise of providing superior answers in the future. It extends an 
open invitation to do more research, which indeed seems worthwhile. As one of the 
editors writes (p. 205): “Developing and fostering a code of ethics and behavior in a 
profession is a slow, painstaking process. But, professionalism can deteriorate with 
frightening rapidity, as we have seen in recent decades. And, once the egg of 
professionalism has been cracked, all of the legal regulations in the world may not be 
able to put Humpty back together again”. 
 
Eric van Damme 
  3